Dr Mireia Giné, IESE Business School, University of Navarra
This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP), a policy that increases shareholder “voice” by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases in market value (five per cent) and to improvements in long-term profitability. In contrast, it has limited effects on pay levels and structure. Taken together our results suggest that SoP can be seen as a repeated regular vote of confidence on the CEO and that it serves as a disciplining device.
Mireia Giné is an assistant professor in the Department of Financial Management at IESE Business School. She received her Bachelors and an MSc in Economics from Pompeu Fabra University. She received her PhD from University of Barcelona and was a visiting scholar at MIT (1999) and at the University of Pennsylvania (2000-2001).
Prior to joining IESE, Professor Giné spent 10 years at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, as a Director at Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). WRDS has become the global standard for data infrastructure and research applications to more than 350 academic and commercial institutions around the world. Professor Giné joined WRDS in 2001 in the early development phase and currently oversees the group’s international corporate initiatives and business development.
Professor Giné’s research interests are focused on corporate finance and executive compensation. Her work examines how corporate governance mechanisms provide value to firms and impact corporate policies. Currently, she is analysing how shareholder activism affects corporate decision-making and compensation practices. Her research has been published in the Journal of Finance and has received several academic awards.