

**ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INNOVATION:  
HOW INSTITUTIONAL VOIDS SHAPE ECONOMIC  
OPPORTUNITIES IN REFUGEE CAMPS**

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## INTRODUCTION

Most forcibly displaced persons in refugee camps spend an average of nearly 20 years in exile (Protracted Refugee Situations Project, 2014) in which life is characterized by frustration, boredom, alcoholism, domestic abuse and violence (Stearns, 2011). As a result, refugee camps tend to manifest high crime rates and struggles with sexual and gender-based violence (Werker, 2007). Engagement in entrepreneurial activity by refugees in camps seems however, to help improve both the socioeconomic prospects of refugees and the climate of the camp. Refugee camp entrepreneurs (RCEs) reduce aid dependency and in so doing help to give life meaning for, and confer dignity on, the entrepreneurs (Humanitarian Innovation Project, 2014). More broadly, RCEs have significant economic potential. For example, Dadaab, one of the world's largest refugee camps based in Kenya, generates approximately USD14M per annum for the host communities that surround the camp and USD25M per annum from refugee enterprises (Okoth, 2012). However, the majority of refugees living in camps do not engage in entrepreneurial activity (Werker, 2007); the average turnover per capita per annum at Dadaab is USD50 (Okoth, 2012; Turner, 2009). In this paper we explore why, despite the benefits RCEs bring to camps, entrepreneurial activity remains a minority activity. We propose that the explanation is rooted in the institutional architecture of refugee camps in that they are a type of institutional void (Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012) in which the formal rules of the game that guide social and economic interactions are not aligned with the rules in practice. Refugee camps are created on the assumption that they are temporary institutions – established in response to an emergency which will ultimately pass – and that refugees will continue to arrive and stay until safe return to their place of

origin is assured. As refugee situations become protracted and the likelihood of swift safe return recedes, the rules of the game concerning temporary institutions do not reflect the reality of life in the camp: the extant rules of the game become paralyzed. We investigate how RCEs navigate the challenges resulting from institutional paralysis and conclude with suggestions for policy and practice.

## **INSTITUTIONAL VOIDS**

### **Institutions**

Institutions are the finely-woven web of values, norms, perceptions, and routines which shape social interactions by creating behavioral expectations that guide individual behavior (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Beliefs and values are said to be institutionalized when actors perceive them to unquestioningly be the only possible way to make sense of the world (Jepperson, 1991). Non-compliance with institutional expectations results in normative sanctions, ultimately leading to a loss of legitimacy as perceived by other actors in our social world (Galasciewicz, 1997). The taken-for-granted nature of institutional expectations and the threat of sanctions for non-compliance collectively serve to assure behavioral conformity. Institutions are maintained through repeated endorsement by individuals in social interactions and become entrenched when actors perform the patterns of behavior encrypted in them until any other behavior becomes unthinkable (Seo and Creed, 2002).

A refugee camp is a physical space, typically fenced off, that is governed by formal rules and routines that differ from those of the host community in which they are situated. Camps thus constitute a distinct social world with unique patterns of interaction, habits and routines (Turner, 2009; Werker, 2007). The camp is a place in which a common meaning system emerges and “whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside the field” (Scott, 1995: 56). Three groups of actors typically associated with refugee camps include: humanitarian organizations responsible for establishing and managing the daily operations in the camps; the forcibly displaced refugees; and the host community and government.

### *Humanitarian Organizations*

The United Nations (UN) mandate the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to assume leadership in the coordination and management of humanitarian relief strategies for refugees (United Nations Treaty Series, 1951). With the financial and political support of many governments and an annual budget of over USD 4 billion, the UNHCR possesses the resources and legitimacy to determine the formal institutional arrangements for refugees (UNHCR, 2014b; Natsios, 1995; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1997). In practice, UNHCR also contracts other UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to implement humanitarian relief strategies (Natsios, 1995). Thus a range of humanitarian organizations is likely to be active in any one refugee camp.

### *The Forcibly Displaced*

Refugee camps are created to accommodate the forcibly displaced who have fled their home country – often in haste and leaving behind all personal possessions. In 2012, although some camps exceed 500,000 refugees (Dadaab, Kenya), the average camp size was approximately 11,400 refugees (UNHCR, 2013). Irrespective of the reason for fleeing e.g., war, persecution, or environmental disaster, all forcibly displaced constitute refugees. The shared feature of refugee crises is that the State in the home country does not, or cannot, offer protection (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 2007). In its place, the refugee camp offers a safe space away from persecution, conflict and killing (McConville, 2014).

### *Host Communities*

The government in the host country determines the geographical location of the refugee camp: a camp in a remote location is likely to have less interaction with other communities in the host country when compared to a camp adjacent to an urban center. The host country government will also specify the legal status of refugees in a camp: in countries where refugees are allowed to work e.g., Uganda (Betts, Bloom and Omata, 2012), interaction with communities in the host country will be higher than in countries where refugee mobility outside the camp is prohibited (UNHCR, 2014; Werker, 2002). Finally, NGO staff in the camp may reside outside the camp in the host country (Werker, 2007) and travel to and from work daily. These three factors influence the permeability of the camps physical and social boundaries and in turn the camp's institutional expectations that guide refugee behavior.

## **Institutional Voids**

The institutional context is inherently pluralistic in that actors encounter a multiplicity of options for how to structure social interactions (Greenwood et al., 2011; Jay, 2013; Battilana and Dorado, 2010). Repeated interactions generally lead to the emergence of a dominant institutional arrangement however, when this does not occur a void exists and the extant institutional arrangement remains poorly structured and highly fragmented (Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012). Although the term institutional void was initially employed to describe contexts lacking formal institutions (e.g., legal systems, codes of conducts, and regulations) an environment can never be entirely empty of institutions (Mair and Marti, 2006): if laws and regulations are absent or weakly enforced, actors negotiate informal institutions to structure social interactions (Chakrabarty, 2009). Rather than spaces lacking institutions, voids are therefore environments in which extant institutions are insufficient in guiding actors' behavior (Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012). From the literature we identified three types of institutional void: paralysis, ambiguity, and incongruence.

### *Paralysis*

Institutions persist through their continuous enactment by the majority of actors in social situations (Barley and Tolbert, 1997) and, from repeated interaction, become embedded and limit behavioral variability (Seo and Creed, 2002). If institutions become too entrenched however, they are less likely to be responsive to individual and environmental change. For example, formal institutions such as laws may be slow to adapt to changing environments and therefore lag behind the actors' social realities. Formal institutions that

have rigidified and failed to adapt to the interests of actors create a void in which the rules of the game are disconnected from the social realities. We employ the label “institutional paralysis” for contexts in which the formally institutionalized rules that proscribe behavior are ignored by actors but non-compliance does not lead to a loss of legitimacy.

### *Ambiguity*

The absence of a formal, complete and strongly enforced institutional arrangement might also lead to a void in which an abundance of different informal institutions co-exists (Luo and Chung, 2013; Chakrabarty, 2009). This may be the result of actors finding different ways of making sense of the social world around them. Particularly in contexts that bring together a heterogeneity of actors, differences in interests, characteristics, and aims may result in divergent ways of sense-making if a dominant institutional arrangement is lacking (Hoffman, 1999). Actors are then no longer able to perceive which institutions are dominant and it remains unclear which perceptions and behaviors are acceptable and which are to be sanctioned (Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012).

### *Incongruence*

An institutional void may arise even when the expectations associated with institutions and the sanctions incurred from non-compliance are evident and clearly specified. Dominant institutional arrangements are essentially the outcome of a majority of actors agreeing on a way of making sense of the social world (Weick, 1993). The higher the degree of agreement on the prevailing institutional arrangement among actors, the more

entrenched and taken-for-granted it becomes (Seo and Creed, 2002). However, minority groups of actors may be dissatisfied when their interests are overruled by the majority and consequently endorse parallel, competing institutions that they perceive to better serve their interests (Webb et al., 2009). The presence of field level heterogeneous interests thus results in complexity – a social environment in which institutions compete with each other (Greenwood et al., 2011). When actors' interests directly contradict each other, incongruence may emerge (Webb et al., 2009). Conflicting understandings of legitimacy as well as power struggles among actors may ultimately lead to the emergence of complex environments in which incongruent institutions emerge, thus providing insufficient guidance to the field's actors (Huegens and Lander, 2009; Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991).

### **Refugee Camps and Institutional Paralysis**

We propose that refugee camps are characterized by institutional paralysis. Refugee camps are founded on the assumption that they provide a temporary space in a host country for forcibly displaced persons until a safe return to their home country is assured. This understanding is endorsed by a set of perceptions and behaviors which we term the *Humanitarian Institutional Arrangement* (HIA) (see below). However, nearly two thirds of refugees — over 6 million — are in protracted situations in that they have spent at least five years in forced exile (PRS Project online, 2014). Furthermore, once refugees fall into the 'protracted' category, the duration of their displacement increases to just under twenty years (ibid.). However, the formal rules relating to refugee camps do not

distinguish between short term (less than five years) and protracted displacement (more than five years) and a void emerges in which the formal rules are not changed to accommodate the protracted displacement.

### *The Humanitarian Institutional Arrangement*

From the literature we identify four constructs that we collectively refer to as the HIA: temporary exile, local resentment, relief discipline, and lack of agency. First, the mission of UNHCR is to "protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide" (UNHCR, 2014: online) and the primary aim is to protect the forcibly displaced until they can safely return to their home country. The implied temporary exile is endorsed by refugees: they leave their homes when "staying would mean certain death" (Buerk, 1984: video) and with the expectation that they will return home after the humanitarian crisis ends (Minear, 2002). The perception of temporary exile is taken-for-granted and resistant to change (Jepperson, 1991; Turner, 2008). Second, host country resentment results from the strain the refugee camp imposes on the resources and capacities of the host community e.g., on local resource exploitation and waste processing and management (Werker, 2002). Although host communities may benefit from an overspill of humanitarian support from the camp, more often than not refugees face local hostility and resentment (UNHCR, 2012a). Third, and perhaps the most visible practice associated with HIA, is the "relief discipline" (Natsios, 1995: 407): the distribution of food, shelter, potable water, and sanitation and medical services. These resources are provided by humanitarian agencies and refugees are little more than passive recipients (Betts, 2013). Turner suggests that humanitarian aid turns refugees into "biological beings that simply need to be kept alive

and healthy while they wait for the day they will return" (Turner, 2009: 325). Finally, individual agency is curtailed in that, with few exceptions, refugees are expected to be docile and dependent: many host country governments deny refugees the right to work, run businesses and own property (UNHCR, 2012a). A journalist visiting a camp hosting Syrian refugees in Jordan describes how "just like in prison, you receive your daily portion of food and water and are asked to wait" (Abu Sarah, 2013: para 18). In addition, camps tend to be isolated from the communities in their host country and camp policies severely restrict the freedom of camp refugees to traverse the boundaries of the camp and interact with the institutions and peoples of the host country (Turner, 2009). The forcibly displaced in protracted refugee situations thus face the prospect of leading lives characterized by "frustration and unrealized potential" (PRS Project online, 2014) in which "boredom and inactivity" prevail (Stearns, 2011: 36). As the individual length of stay in the refugee camp passes the five year benchmark, the prevailing HIA no longer reflects the lived reality of the refugees. A Rwandan refugee in a camp in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) described: "Feeling useless is the worst" (as cited in Stearns, 2011: 39). The institutional expectations guiding social interactions for temporary exile no longer reflect the social and economic reality of protracted displacement.

## **INSTITUTIONAL PARALYSIS**

The HIA assumptions of temporary exile, local resentment, relief discipline and lack of agency suggest that refugee camps are unlikely places for fostering entrepreneurial activity. Temporary exile and local resentment may limit access to resources and markets, and the distribution of relief and lack of agency may reduce the incentives to risk the investment of time and resources in entrepreneurial activity (Down and Warren, 2008). Yet camps are prevalent with many small innovative refugee-led businesses such as bars, cafes, food stalls, hair dressers, and maintenance and repair shops (Cavaglieri, no date). In Rwandan refugee camps in the DRC "bustling markets appeared" (Stearns, 2011: 35) and "a camp will have one or more trading centers" (Werker, 2007: 462). Given that the dominant HIA is not conducive to the resources, agency and incentives associated with entrepreneurial behavior, we are guided by the question: what barriers do refugee camp entrepreneurs face and how do they overcome them?

Although a plethora of research has investigated the barriers to entrepreneurship in a variety of contexts, we know little about the unique challenges that RCEs face. However, as the majority of refugee camps are located in developing countries, we draw on studies that analyze barriers to entrepreneurship in developing country contexts to frame our analysis.

### **Institutional Barriers to Entrepreneurship**

From the literature on the barriers to entrepreneurship we identified three institutional barriers: lack of functioning markets; inefficient legal and political systems; and insufficient infrastructure.

### *Lack of Functioning Markets*

Access to finance and credit to buy resources is crucial for the success of entrepreneurial ventures (Pissarides et al., 2003). Without available and functioning mechanisms to secure seed money and external financing, entrepreneurs are forced to rely on personal savings or informal lending to fund their enterprises (Thornton et al., 2011). The assumed short term nature of refugee camps is unlikely to be conducive to the creation of enterprise-oriented financial institutions and functioning markets for finance (Werker, 2007). Instead, informal and poorly structured financial markets might emerge in which refugees rely on personal networks and informal financial agreements to fund their entrepreneurial ventures (Betts et al., 2013).

### *Inefficient Legal and Political Systems*

The legal and political barriers to entrepreneurship include widespread corruption, slow and inefficient administrative procedures, and lack of property rights enforcement, (Peci et al., 2012). Aidis et al. (2012) argue that corruption constrains entrepreneurship by deterring entrepreneurs unwilling to engage in corrupt practices and encouraging unproductive forms of entrepreneurship. Slow and inefficient administrative procedures may create an environment in which setting up a business becomes a lengthy and costly process that deters entrepreneurs. Finally, property rights have been found to “form the backbone of...the market economy” (Aidis et al., 2012: 122). However, the existence of property rights is insufficient for entrepreneurship (Sonin, 2003) if the rights are not effectively enforced.

In a study of the Kyangwali Refugee Settlement in Uganda, refugee entrepreneurs faced corruption and, most severely, lengthy administrative procedures when trying to set up a business (Werker, 2007). In particular, the restricted freedom of movement means that entrepreneurs are forced to engage in a complex bureaucratic process if they wish to access external markets and gather market information.

#### *Insufficient Infrastructure*

Poorly developed physical infrastructures for transport, electricity, and water (Coad and Tamvada, 2012) and lack of access to suppliers and consumer markets constrain to entrepreneurship in developing countries (Pissarides et al., 2003). In protracted refugee situations, wavering donor support may undermine confidence in the consistent provision of the physical infrastructure (Betts et al., 2013). Moreover, as explained above, access to suppliers and markets is inhibited by the physical isolation of the camp from its host communities (Werker, 2007).

### **Organizational Barriers to Entrepreneurship**

Organizational barriers to entrepreneurship in developing countries include: access to resources; access to finance; low market demand; and lack of market information.

#### *Access to Resources*

Entrepreneurs' access to resources to create and market profitable goods or services is the foundation of any successful business. The land allocated for camps "does not tend to be

of the highest quality" (Werker, 2007: 472) and refugee camps are often located in deserts or other resource-scarce environments (UNHCR, 2012a). Refugees are thus likely to face barriers to securing the raw materials required to create goods and services to sell.

#### *Access to Finance*

One of the most frequently cited barriers to entrepreneurship is poor access to affordable credit (Tagoe et al., 2005). In context in which financial markets are poorly structured, loans may be associated with high interest rates as well as high depreciation and inflation rates (Robson and Obeng, 2008). As a result, potential entrepreneurs may not be able to afford the costs of debt finance.

In refugee camps, the majority of entrepreneurs are forced to rely on personal savings or remittances from their friends and relatives in order to start their business (Crisp, 2003). Alternatively, opportunities for informal lending may be available from members of the surrounding host communities (Werker, 2007). The absence of formal mechanisms to borrow money or attract seed funding consequently constrains entrepreneurs from setting up businesses. Without personal networks it becomes nearly impossible to engage in entrepreneurial activity (Thornton et al., 2011).

#### *Low Levels of Demand*

In developing countries, the potential customer base may be limited due to low average levels of income and wide-spread engagement in subsistence activities such as farming (Orser et al., 2000). As a result, access to demand from multiple communities becomes a vital factor in assuring entrepreneurial success. Honig (1998), for instance, finds that

entrepreneurs' membership in various communities such as local churches or family clans helps generate a base of potential customers among those groups.

The relief discipline of camps however reduces demand in the presence of freely available relief items. In addition, the costs incurred by refugee entrepreneurs when accessing an outside market may mean that they are no longer competitive: the fees and taxes incurred from the administrative procedures ultimately translate into higher prices of their products and services (Werker, 2007).

#### *Lack of Market Information*

Access to market information is crucial for entrepreneurial success as it assures that products and services are tailored to consumers' preferences and remain competitive with similar products (Jack and Anderson, 2002). For refugee entrepreneurs, it is difficult to access external market information due to the remoteness of the camps and their separation from the broader environment (Werker, 2007). Moreover, within the camp, market information may not be readily available. Sales may be disbursed over time and place and be mediated privately through personal networks (Stearns, 2011). As a result, market information may be dependent on entrepreneurs' family and personal networks (Thornton et al., 2011).

## NAVIGATING THE INSTITUTIONAL VOID

### **Refugee Entrepreneurs Navigating the Institutional Void**

Despite the institutional and organizational barriers typically faced by entrepreneurs in resource constrained environments (Jack and Anderson, 2002), the presence of numerous small ventures in all refugee camps (e.g. Betts et al., 2013; Werker, 2007) suggests that RCEs have found ways to overcome the institutional and organizational barriers they faced.

#### *Institutional Barriers*

Lack of functioning markets, especially financial markets, may be overcome through lending groups. In Sudan, refugees formed mutual help associations in which the monthly savings contributions are lent to those in need and entrepreneurs requiring seed capital (UNHCR, 2012b). The mutual help association thus provides a method for financing RCEs who may not have access to family savings or remittances.

Inefficient legal and political systems may be navigated by avoiding the complex and costly bureaucratic procedures associated with setting up a business outside the camp. Instead, members of the surrounding host communities may enter the camp to purchase the goods and services marketed by RCEs. Stearns (2011) describes how markets appeared at the fringes of the refugee camp in order to allow the Congolese host community to access the products and services sold by Rwandan refugees' businesses. Werker (2007) also commented on how regular markets allow members of the host communities to trade with refugees.

Finally, RCEs may either improve the available infrastructure themselves – for example by building power generators or rainwater collectors (HIPa, 2014; HIPb, 2014) – or exploit the lack of infrastructure as a business opportunity, for example, by establishing internet cafes or mobile phone shops, which help create a virtual infrastructure that may, in turn, create new opportunities for refugee entrepreneurs (Crisp, 2003).

### *Organizational Barriers*

To overcome poor access to formal finance, refugees tend to rely on social networks, families, and remittances for funding (Crisp, 2003). In addition, paid employment within the camp e.g., employment with the UNHCR and NGOs may offer opportunities to accrue additional capital (Werker, 2007). To overcome poor access to resources, RCEs may leverage human capital accrued prior to their refugee status e.g., trained nurses may create health care businesses (HIPc, 2014) and tailors retail clothing, fabrics and repair services (HIPd, 2014). In addition, RCEs may employ relief items in innovative ways, for example by creating bicycles out of the firewood (HIPE, 2014).

Low demand may be overcome by expanding the scope of customers targeted by entrepreneurs. In Kyangwali settlement in Uganda, refugees established a company, the Kyangwali Progressive Farmers Limited, to supply sorghum to a major Ugandan beverage company (Omata and Kaplan, 2013). By combining modest individual agricultural output into a collaborative venture, RCEs were collectively able to reach an external market and create a profitable business-to-business entrepreneurial venture.

Finally, lack of market information may be overcome by creating a novel virtual infrastructure from mobile phones and the internet. This would enable RCEs to gather up-

to-date information on internal and external markets and exploit opportunities to tailor their products and services to customer demands.

### **SUGGESTIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE**

The limited empirical data from refugee camps suggests that RCEs have found ways to navigate the institutional paralysis and the barriers to entrepreneurship they encounter. However, the dominant HIA effectively creates and maintains barriers to entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship thus remains a minority activity in refugee camps. We identify five opportunities for policy makers to foster an environment conducive to entrepreneurship and legitimizing RCEs.

#### *Introduce Refugee Camp Livelihood Programs*

As discussed, the location of a refugee camp and the legal rights of refugees is determined by the host country government. In Uganda, for example, refugees are permitted to work and move relatively freely throughout the country (Werker, 2007; Betts et al., 2012). In most other contexts however, refugee camps are located in remote, resource-scarce environments and the freedom of movement of refugees is severely restricted (Crisp, 2003). Within the camps, the HIA institutionalizes dependency and lack of self-determination. More recently however, the UNHCR noted that “livelihood programming” needs “to begin as early as possible after immediate humanitarian needs

have been met and as people begin to settle" (UNHCR, 2012a: 14). Although rarely executed in practice (Betts, 2013: 10) the acknowledgement by the UNHCR of the need to introduce livelihood programs suggests that the HIA can respond to the expectations of refugees concerning agency and self-determination.

One promising avenue to help refugees overcome barriers to entrepreneurship is through the introduction of cash-based aid programs. As recently piloted in Gore camp in Southern Chad, the transfer of cash aid to refugees is a source of capital for RCEs and also confers some degree of agency, independence and autonomy over how cash is spent (Harvey and Bailey, 2011).

#### *Broaden Stakeholder Engagement*

Every refugee camp is unique and market-based interventions require a detailed understanding of the specific economic, social and environmental context of each camp. UNHCR policies and operations are centrally planned in association with camp management teams and widening the range of stakeholders included in consultation and planning processes would enable policies to be adapted to respond to the individual camp contexts. For example, include RCEs in initiatives to re-shape the HIA away from dependency and lack of agency to autonomy and self-determination. Similarly, protracted refugee camps tend to resemble small cities rather than transient settlements (Perouse de Montclos and Kagwanja, 2000) for example, Za'atari refugee camp is Jordan's fourth largest 'city' (Remnick, 2013). As such, the infrastructure requirements are similar to those of medium-sized cities. Include urban planners in the early phases of the humanitarian emergency to design out future infrastructure problems.

### *Establish Access to Financial Markets*

Although access to capital is crucial to any entrepreneurial venture RCEs primarily rely on personal savings or remittances to finance their businesses. Initiatives such as the lending groups in Sudan remain the exception. Partnerships between the camp and local banks and micro-lending institutions would allow RCEs to access seed capital for their ventures. Another avenue to improve access to financial markets may be by increasing the presence of organizations that are specialized in the provision of financial services in camps' humanitarian system.

### *Establish Refugee Camp Innovation Hubs*

Innovation hubs have been created in Nairobi and many other cities in Africa and India to provide a place for entrepreneurs “to meet, brain-storm, share ideas and collaborate through meet-ups, workshops, focus groups, hackathons and competitions” (Gathege & Moraa, 2013: 16). RCEs currently operate with the institutionalized rules of most camps and to foster the social and economic benefits that accrue from RCEs, establish innovation centers to provide access to business advice, marketing support and seed capital. The idea of refugee innovation centers has also begun to feature on the agenda of humanitarian organizations and may provide a means by which potential refugee entrepreneurs are able to overcome the many hurdles to forming a profitable business (Betts et al., 2013).

### *Encourage External Market Development*

Policies that restrict the freedom of movement of refugees to within the camp serve to constrain the development of markets inside the boundaries of the refugee camp. Resources are thus trapped in a closed circle. Examples of successful market development such as the refugee farmers in Kyangwalee described previously are as yet rare (Omata and Kaplan, 2013).

### *Support Employment Creation Initiatives*

Policies that curtail refugee employment opportunities contribute to the high levels of boredom and frustration experienced by refugees. Opportunities to create employment however exist within the camp and between the camp and the host country. For example, in the Dadaab refugee camp, the social enterprise Samasource has outsourced small digital tasks to refugees with basic computer skills (Betts et al., 2013). As a result, refugees have been able to save capital to start a business, develop social networks, meet like-minded individuals and improve computer skills. Supporting employment creation opportunities may also help to reduce camp conflict and unrest.

To conclude, as the number of forcibly displaced increases, the urgency to find solutions to redress the negative aspects of life in a refugee camp for those in protracted exile also rises. In addition to improving the dignity of refugees and the socioeconomic climate of a camp, new policies to support livelihood development, broaden stakeholder engagement, develop innovation hubs, develop genuine markets and create employment opportunities may also make a positive contribution to the economy of the host country and in so doing help to reduce the local resentment experienced by those living in camps.

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